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"STALK TALK": A FIRST LOOK AT ANTI-STALKING
LEGISLATION
Robert John Bardo, a nineteen year old unemployed fast food worker
from Tucson, Arizona, was obsessed with television actress Rebecca Schaef-
fer, co-star of the series "My Sister Sam."' He carried a publicity photo
of the actress with him, called her publicity agency several times, and sent
her fan mail. 2 After obtaining her address from the state Department of
Motor Vehicles, on July 18, 1989, Bardo culminated his obsession by
shooting Schaeffer in the chest after she opened the security door to her
Los Angeles apartment. 3 That same year five Orange County, California
women were killed in a six week period by former husbands or boyfriends
after courts had issued restraining orders against the men to prevent ha-
rassment.4 In response to these murders, California enacted the nation's
first 'stalking' law in 1990.1 Section 646.9 of the California Penal Code,
effective January 1, 1991, makes it a crime to repeatedly follow or harass
someone.
6
California is no longer the only state to criminalize this threatening
behavior. In 1992 through mid-1993, an additional forty-eight states passed
stalking laws, including Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington.7 In mid-1993, similar legislation was
1. Robert Welkos & George Ramos, "Obsessive Fan" Seized in Tucson in Actress'
Slaying, L.A. TMS, July 20, 1989, at 1.
2. Id.
3. Id.; Denise Hamilton, Trial to Begin in Stalking of Weatherman, L.A. TIMEs, Feb.
25, 1993, at JI.
4. Michael Connelly, Ex-Boyfriend Jailed Under 'Stalking' Law, L.A. TIms, June 10,
1991, at BI.
5. See James Quinn, Man Who Stalked Ex-Girlfriend Sent to Prison, L.A. TImEs, Apr.
9, 1992 at B3 and Rosalind Resnick, States Enact 'Stalking' Laws, NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1992,
at 3 (discussing California's stalking law).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). See infra note 19 (giving partial text
of California's stalking law).
7. The states that passed anti-stalking legislation in 1992 and 1993 are Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-90 to -94
(Supp. 1992); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260-.270 (1993); Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (1993);
1993 Ark. Acts 388; CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT,. ANN.
§§ 53a-181c, -181d (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1992); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-90 to -93 (Michie Supp.
1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 720, paras. 5/12-7.3, 5/12-7.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-
10-1 to -5 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West Supp. 1993); 1992 Kan. Sess.
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pending in Oregon.8 On the federal level, Congressman Ed Royce and
Senator Barbara Boxer of California proposed legislation in early 1993 that
would make stalking a federal crime. 9
These stalking laws are part of an effort by legislators to counter the
ineffectiveness of injunctions and restraining orders in preventing stalking
and other domestic violence.' 0 Some critics, however, question whether the
new laws will be any more effective in deterring mentally disturbed stalkers."
Laws 298; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.130-.150 (Baldwin Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1993); Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 762 (West Supp. 1993); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121B (1993 Supp.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp.
1993); MicH. Comp. LAWS §§ 750.411h, 750.411i (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (1994
Supp.); MISS. CODE Am. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1992); H.B. 194, 87th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess.,
1993 Mo. Legis. Serv.; S.B. 37, 53rd Leg., Reg. Sess., 1993 Mont. Laws ch. 292; NEB. Rv.
STAT. §§ 28-311.02 to .05 (Supp. 1992); 1993 Nev. Stat. ch. 233; N.H. Ra,. STAT. ANN.
§ 633:3-a (1993 Supp.); N.J. Ra,. STAT. § 2C: 12-10 (Supp. 1993); H.B. 8, 41st Leg., Ist Reg.
Sess., 1993 N.M. Laws -; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.14, 240.25, 240.26 (McKinney Supp. 1993);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (Supp. 1992); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.211-.215 (Baldwin
Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1173 (Supp. 1993); 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 1993-28
(Purdon) (to be codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709 (1994)); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-
59-1 to -3 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070 (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODImD LAWS ANN.
§§ 22-19A-1 to -6 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992); S.B. 25, 73rd
Leg., Reg. Sess., 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 10 (to be codified at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 42.07(a)(7) (West 1993)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1061-63 (1993 Supp.); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1992); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993). See Henry J. Holcomb,
Florio Signs Anti-Stalking Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 6, 1993, at B4 (explaining New Jersey's
stalking law); Mitchell Landsberg, Stalker Laws Among Many That Will Take Effect Tomor-
row, PHaA. INQUIMER, June 30, 1992, at A5 (describing various new stalking laws); Tamar
Lewin, New Laws Address Old Problem, N.Y. Tndms, Feb. 8, 1993, at Al (explaining stalking
laws); Elizabeth Ross, Problem of Men Stalking Women Spurs New Laws, CaiuN ScI.
MotrroR, June 11, 1992, at 6 (same); Gary Spencer, State Tightens Penalty for Stalking,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 1992, at 1 (explaining New York's stalking law).
8. S.B. 833, 67th Legis. Ass., Reg. Sess., 1993 Or. Laws ch. 626.
9. H.R. 740, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See
Bill McAllister, Senator's Wife Urges Anti-Stalking Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1993, at A20
(relating difficulties facing Senate Judiciary Committee in its attempt to draft federal stalking
law) and Constance Sommer, Senator, Wife Know Awful Lot About Stalkers, L.A. TiEs,
Mar. 18, 1993, at A5 (explaining details of Senator Boxer's proposed federal stalking law).
10. See e.g., Kenneth R. Thomas, How to Stop the Stalker: State Antistalking Laws, 29
Cam. L. BULL. 124, 127 (1993) (explaining problems with civil protection orders); Kenneth L.
Wainstein, Comment, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of Preventing Continuing
Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CAL. L. RE. 727, 733 (1988) (discussing
ineffectiveness of restraining orders and injunctions in preventing domestic violence); Note, A
Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 VA. L. Ray. 507, 514 (1984) (explaining disadvantages
of injunctive relief for harassment victims); Melinda Beck, Murderous Obsession, NEwswaai,
July 13, 1992, at 60, 61 (discussing difficulty in enforcing restraining orders); Ross, supra note
7, at 6 (discussing problems with restraining orders in protecting women from abusive husbands
and boyfriends).
11. See Beck, supra note 10, at 61 (quoting clinical psychologist Stanton Samenow as
questioning deterrent effect of imprisonment on mentally disturbed stalkers); Kevin Fagan,
New Focus on Deadly Stalkers, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 11, 1993, at Al (arguing that increased
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Additionally, others claim that the language of many of the new statutes
may be unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.12 The specific provisions in
certain stalking laws providing for presumption of intent,
3 denial of bail, 14
and arrest without warrant"5 may present other constitutional concerns. To
assist the states in their efforts to draft constitutional stalking legislation,
in 1992 Congress ordered the Attorney General to develop a model stalking
law by September 30, 1993.16
This Note will begin by examining the California stalking law as a
model for other anti-stalking legislation. It will then discuss some selected
departures from the California model. A constitutional analysis of the basic
California statute and unusual provisions in other states' laws will follow.
After a brief discussion of the federal stalking legislation, the Note will
conclude with a proposed model stalking statute.
I. CALIFORsNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 646.9
In effect since January 1, 1991, California's stalking law was the first
enacted in the United States. 7 Due to its groundbreaking status and the
notoriety surrounding its passage, the California statute has served as a
model for many of the statutes enacted or pending in other states. 18 Because
attention on stalking has not deterred problem); Gera-Lind Kolarik, Stalking Laws Proliferate,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 35, 36 (quoting Illinois Public Defender Joseph V. Collina as
questioning whether jail will deter stalkers); Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Terror of
Stalking, USA TODAY, July 21, 1992 at 9A (citing preliminary research on celebrity stalking
for proposition that 90% of stalkers suffer from mental disorders).
12. See infra notes 98-167 and accompanying text (reviewing selected stalking laws for
overbreadth and vagueness).
13. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (explaining details of statutory pres-
umptions in Washington's and Michigan's stalking laws) and notes 174-91 and accompanying
text (discussing constitutional validity of statutory presumptions in Washington's and Michi-
gan's laws).
14. See infra notes 46-65 and accompanying text (explaining details of provisions for
denying bail to stalkers in Illinois, Ohio, and Iowa) and notes 192-227 and accompanying text
(discussing constitutional validity of provisions for denying bail to stalkers in Illinois, Ohio,
and Iowa).
15. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (explaining details for provisions allowing
arrest without warrant in stalking laws of Florida and Ohio) and notes 228-245 and accom-
panying text (discussing validity of warrantless misdemeanor arrest).
16. Act of Oct. 6, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 109(b). See infra notes 255-56 and
accompanying text (discussing details of federal legislation); see also Seth Schiesel, Federal
Measure Would Bar Stalking, BosToN GLOBE, July 2, 1992, at 5 (explaining details of federal
stalking bill).
17. Resnick, supra note 5, at 3.
18. Among the states whose stalking legislation reflects the influence of California's law
are Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah. See
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 to -94 (Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298; Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 508.130
(Baldwin Supp. 1992); LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1993); Mss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-107 (Supp. 1992); NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 28-311.02 to .03 (Supp. 1992); N.J. Rav. STAT.
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of its impact, a review of the provisions of the California stalking law is
appropriate.
California's stalking law makes it illegal to intentionally scare someone
through repeated following, harassment, and threats. 19 Stalking is a misde-
meanor, punishable by up to one year in a county jail or a $1000 fine, or
both.20 The statute, however, treats stalking as a felony under special
circumstances. For example, the sentencing court may order imprisonment
in the state penitentiary if the defendant violates an existing restraining
order or injunction when stalking the victim. 2' The court also may punish
a repeat offender with a state prison term if the subsequent conviction was
for stalking the same victim.22 Under a 1992 amendment to the original
stalking law, the court has the authority to order counseling for the convicted
stalker as a condition of probation or suspended sentence.3 It also may
issue a restraining order prohibiting contact between the stalker and the
victim for up to ten years. 24
In an apparent effort to avoid invalidation on the grounds of over-
breadth or vagueness, the California statute provides precise definitions of
§ 2C: 12-10 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1173 (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-
59-1 to -3 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070 (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFID LAWS ANN.
§§ 22-19A-I to -6 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1992).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). Section 646.9(a) states in part:
Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another
person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury or to place that person in reasonable
fear of the death or great bodily injury of his or her immediate family is guilty of
the crime of stalking....
Id.
20. Id. § 646.9(a).
21. Id. § 646.9(b). Section 646.9(b) reads:
Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary restraining order,
injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting the behavior described in
subdivision (a) against the same party, is punishable by imprisonment in a county
jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars
($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state
prison.
Id.
22. Id. § 646.0(c),(d). These subsections state:
(c) A second or subsequent conviction occurring within seven years of a prior
conviction under subdivision (a) against the same victim, and involving an act of
violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in subdivision (f), is punishable
by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment,
or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(d) Every person who, having been convicted of a felony under this section, commits
a second or subsequent violation of this section against the same victim and involving
an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in subdivision (f),
is punishable in the state prison, for 16 months, two or three years and a fine up
to ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
Id.
23. Id. § 646.9(h).
24. Id. § 646.9(i).
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some of the critical terms used to describe the crime of stalking. 25 This
effort is augmented by two disclaimer clauses. The first clause states that
constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of any
stalking "course of conduct. ' 26 The second clause states that the stalking
law does not apply to conduct that occurs during labor picketing.27
II. WASHINGTON AND MICHIGAN: PRESUbMD INTENT
In contrast to California's requirement that a stalker specifically intend
to scare the victim,2 the stalking laws of the states of Washington and
Michigan allow intent to be presumed from the stalker's conduct. Wash-
ington's stalking law, effective June 11, 1992,29 provides for an alternative
to specific intent; the stalker must either intend to scare the victim or know
or reasonably be aware that the victim is scared. 30 The stalker's constructive
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9. California's stalking law defines "harasses" as a knowing
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys,
harasses, or terrorizes the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. Id. § 646.9(e). To
further clarify the California legislature's concept of "harass," the statute defines "course of
conduct" as a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however
short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Id. The statute also requires the course of conduct
be one that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and has
actually caused the stalking victim substantial emotional distress. Id. Requiring the stalker's
conduct to satisfy both objective and subjective criteria in determining its impact on the victim
would seem to minimize the chance that a court might convict for stalking because of a
victim's unusual sensitivity to harassment. The statute defines "credible threat" as one made
with the intent and apparent ability to carry it out so as to cause the target of the threat to
reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family. Id. § 646.9(0.
Again, the California legislature has included an objective standard by requiring the fear to
be "reasonable."
26. Id. § 646.9(e).
27. Id. § 646.9(g).
28. Id. § 646.9(a).
29. John White, New State Laws Take Effect Tomorrow, SrAT=L POST-INTELLIGENCER,
June 10, 1992, at B2 (explaining Washington's stalking law).
30. WAsH. REy. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.1 10 (West Supp. 1993). Washington's new stalking
law reads in part:
(1) A person commits the crime or stalking if, without lawful authority and under
circumstances not amounting to a felony attempt of another crime:
(a) He or she intentionally and repeatedly follows another person to that person's
home, school, place of employment, business, or any other location, or follows the
person while the person is in transit between locations; and
(b) The person being followed is intimidated, harassed, or placed in fear that the
stalker intends to injure the person or property of the person being followed or of
another person. The feeling of fear, intimidation, or harassment must be one that
a reasonable person in the same situation would experience under all the circum-
stances; and
(c) TJhe stalker either:
(i) Intends to frighten, intimidate, or harass the person being followed; or
(ii) Knows or reasonably should know that the person being followed is afraid,
intimidated, or harassed even if the stalker did not intend to place the person in
fear or intimidate or harass the person.
1993] 1307
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knowledge that he scared the victim appears sufficient to satisfy the law's
intent requirement, because a lack of intent to scare the victim is not a
defense to the crime.3 Even though it allows for the conviction of a stalker
without a finding of specific intent, the Washington stalking statute further
assists the prosecution by treating attempts by the stalker to contact or
follow the victim after being asked to stop as a presumption of an intent
to harass or intimidate.3 2
Michigan's stalking law, effective January 1, 1993, 33 requires a willful
course of conduct by the stalker but does not explicitly require an intent
to threaten or harass the victim.34 Rather than turning on the assailant's
intent, the classification of the harassing conduct as stalking depends on
whether the victim is scared and whether that reaction is reasonable. 5 The
requirement that the victim be scared may be presumed if the stalker
continues after being warned to stop.1
6
In Michigan, the assailant does not have to expressly threaten the victim
to be charged with stalking.37 A stalker who makes a credible threat against
the victim or a member of the victim's family is guilty of the more serious
offense of aggravated stalking, a felony punishable by up to five years
imprisonment or a $10,000 fine, or both. 8 The Michigan legislature also
31. Id. para. 2. Paragraph 2 states:
(2)(a) It is not a defense to the crime of stalking under subsection (l)(c)(i) of this
section that the stalker was not given actual notice that the person being followed
did not want the stalker to contact or follow the person; and
(b) It is not a defense to the crime of stalking under subsection (1)(c)(ii) of this
section that the stalker did not intend to frighten, intimidate, or harass the person
being followed.
Id.
32. Id. para. 4. Paragraph 4 states: "Attempts to contact or follow the person after
being given actual notice that the person does not want to be contacted or followed constitutes
prima facie evidence that the stalker intends to intimidate or harass the person." Id.
33. See Amber Arellano, Law Lets Police Charge Suspect in Stalking, DETRorr FREE
PREss, Jan. 21, 1993, at IB (describing Michigan's stalking law).
34. MICH. Con. LAws. § 750.411h (Supp. 1993). Section 411h(l)(d) reads: 'Stalking'
means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another
individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated,
threatened, harassed, or molested, and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested." Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. § 411h(4).
Section 441h(4) reads:
In a prosecution for a violation of this section, evidence that the defendant continued
to engage in a course of conduct involving repeated unconsented contact with the
victim after having been requested by the victim to discontinue the same or a
different form of unconsented contact, and to refrain from any further unconsented
contact with the victim, shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the contin-
uation of the course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 411h.
38. Id. § 750.411i. Stalking a victim in violation of an injunction or restraining order;
1308
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has made provisions to allow the stalking victim to institute a civil action
for damages against the stalker.3 9
III. ILLINOIS, OHIO, IOWA, AND MASSACHUSETTS: PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Although California's statute has served as a model for many other
states' anti-stalking legislation,40 Illinois, Ohio, and Iowa have departed
from the model by providing for limitations on bail for the accused or
convicted stalker. Illinois enacted its stalking law, one of the nation's
toughest, on July 12, 1992.41 The state classifies stalking as a Class 4
felony, 42 punishable by up to three years in prison. 43 A stalker who harms,
confines, or restrains the victim or violates an injunction, protection order,
or temporary restraining order is guilty of aggravated stalking,44 a Class 3
in violation of a condition of probation, pretrial release, or appeal bond; or with a previous
stalking conviction also qualifies as aggravated stalking. Id.
39. Id. § 600.2954. See also Engler Signs Bill to Stop Stalkers, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Dec. 12, 1992, at 17A (describing details of Michigan's stalking law). Wyoming also has
provided for civil actions against stalkers. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-126 (Supp. 1993).
40. See supra note 18 (listing stalking statutes with language very similar to California's
statute).
41. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, paras. 5/12-7.3, 5/12-7.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993). See Anti-
Stalking Bill Signed In Illinois, CLEvE.AND PL~rN DEALER, July 13, 1992, at 8A (explaining
details of and history behind Illinois stalking law); Kolarik, supra note 11, at 35 (explaining
provisions of Illinois stalking law).
42. ILL. Ar. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Section 12-7.3 states:
(a) A person commits stalking when he or she transmits to another person a threat
with the intent to place that person in reasonable apprehension of death, bodily
harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint, and in furtherance of the threat
knowingly does any one or more of the following acts on at least two separate
occasions:
(1) follows the person, other than within the residence of the defendant;
(2) places the person under surveillance by remaining present outside his or her
school, place of employment, vehicle, other place occupied by the person, or residence
other than the residence of the defendant.
(b) Sentence. Stalking is a Class 4 felony. A second or subsequent conviction for
stalking is a Class 3 felony.
(c) Exemption. This section does not apply to picketing occurring at the workplace
that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute.
Id.
43. Id. ch. 730, para. 5/5-8-1(7):
44. Id. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.4. Section 12-7.4 reads:
(a) A person commits aggravated stalking when he or she, in conjunction with
committing the offense of stalking, also does any of the following:
(1) causes bodily harm to the victim;
(2) confines or restrains the victim; or
(3) violates a temporary restraining order, an order of protection, or an injunction
prohibiting the behavior described in subsection (b)(1) of the Section 214 of the
Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.
(b) Sentence. Aggravated stalking is a Class 3 felony. A second or subsequent
conviction for aggravated stalking is a Class 2 felony.
(c) Exemption. This section does not apply to picketing occurring at the workplace
that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute.
1993] 1309
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felony punishable by up to five years in prison.45
The most unusual element of the Illinois stalking legislation is its
provisions for denial of bail before trial.46 These provisions have been a
subject of controversy in the Illinois legal community: since the law's
passage. 47 Under the new Illinois law, state courts have the authority to
deny bail to a defendant charged with stalking or aggravated stalking, a
power historically restricted to capital and life-imprisonment offenses.
48 If
the state alleges that the accused stalker poses a threat to the victim, the
court must hold a hearing to determine whether it should deny bail.
49 If
the defendant has not yet been released on bail and requests a continuance
to prepare for the hearing, the court may hold him in custody during the
continuance. 0 The state may hold an unreleased defendant in custody during
a state-requested continuance if the defendant previously has violated a
protection order or been convicted of assault, battery, stalking, or sexual
assault against the alleged victim. 5' The procedures for the ball detention
hearing are similar to those of a criminal trial, with one major exception:
45. Id. ch. 730, para. 5/5-8-1(6).
46. Id. ch. 725, para. 5/110-6.3. Another unusual feature of the Illinois stalking legislation
package is its mental health treatment section. The sentencing court may order the parole
board to consider requiring the convicted stalker to undergo mental health treatment as a
condition of parole or probation. Id. ch. 730, para. 5/3-14-5. Similarly, Hawaii's stalking law
gives a sentencing court the authority to order counseling for the convicted stalker. HAw.
REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992).
47. See Joseph V. Collina, Stalking Law Is Bad Legislation, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., July
31, 1992, at 5 (containing public defender's criticism of bail provisions in Illinois stalking law).
48. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/110-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Paragraph 5/110-4 reads
in part:
(a) All persons shall be bailable before conviction, except the following offenses
where the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant is guilty of
the offense: capital offenses; offenses for which a sentence of life imprisonment may
be imposed as a consequence of imprisonment, without conditional and revocable
release, shall be imposed by law as a consequence of conviction, where the court
after a hearing, determines that the release of the defendant would pose a real and
present threat to the physical safety of any person or persons; or stalking or
aggravated stalking, where the court, after a hearing determines that the release of
the defendant would pose a real and present threat to the physical safety of the
alleged victim of the offense and denial of bail is necessary to prevent fulfillment
of the threat upon which the charge is based.
Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. para. 5/110-6.3. Paragraph 5/110-6.3(a) reads:
Upon verified petition by the State, the court shall hold a hearing to determine
whether bail should be denied to a defendant who is charged with stalking or
aggravated stalking, when it is alleged that the defendant's admission to bail poses
a real and present threat to the physical safety of the alleged victim of the offense,
and denial of release on bail or personal recognizance is necessary to prevent
fulfillment of the threat upon which the charge is based.
Id.
50. Id. para. 5/110-6.3(a)(2). The defendant's continuance may not exceed five calendar
days. Id.
51. Id. The state's continuance cannot exceed three days. Id.
1310
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the rules governing admissibility of evidence do not apply. 2 Thus, the
prosecution may use evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and
seizure in its efforts to deny the accused stalker bail. 3 The Illinois statute
provides that the court may deny bail once it determines that: (1) it is
evident or presumed that the defendant committed the stalking offense; (2)
the defendant poses a threat to the victim; (3) denial of bail is necessary to
prevent fulfillment of the threat; and (4) no combination of conditions can
reasonably assure the victim's safety. 54 If the court denies bail, it must bring
the detained defendant to trial within ninety days of the detention order."5
Ohio's stalking legislation also contains limitations on bail for an
accused stalker.56 If the accused stalker violates a restraining order in his
contact with the victim or has a previous conviction for stalking or a similar
crime involving the same victim, the court must consider a number of
factors when deciding on the amount and conditions of bail, including the
stalker's mental state and the threat to the victim.57 In addition to any
restriction imposed by bail, the victim may move for an "anti-stalking
protection order" as a condition of the accused stalker's pretrial release.58
The court may issue such an order if it finds that the continued presence
of the accused stalker threatens the victim, and that order may include a
requirement that the accused stalker not enter the residence, school, or
workplace of the alleged victim.5 9 Violation of an anti-stalking protection
52. Id. para 5/110-6.3(c)(l)(A). "The rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in
criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the
hearing." Id.
53. Id. para. 5/110-6.3(c)(1)(B). Paragraph 5/110-6.3(c)(1)(B) reads:
A motion by the defendant to suppress evidence or to suppress a confession shall
not be entertained. Evidence that proof may have been obtained as the result of an
unlawful search and seizure or through improper interrogation is not relevant to this
state of the prosecution.
Id.
54. Id. para. 5/110-6.3(b). Among the numerous factors the court may consider in
evaluating the defendant's threat to the victim are: the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the age and physical condition of
the victim; and the defendant's propensity for violent behavior. Id. para. 5/110-6.3(d).
55. Id. para. 5/110-6.3(0.
56. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.211-.215 (Baldwin Supp. 1992).
57. Id. § 2903.212. The factors the Ohio court must consider when deciding on ball for
an accused stalker are:
(1) Whether the person has a history of violence toward the complainant or a history
of other violent acts;
(2) The mental health of the person;
(3) Whether the person has a history of violating the orders of any court or
governmental entity;
(4) Whether the person is potentially a threat to any other person;
(5) Whether setting ball at a high level will interfere with any treatment or counseling
that the person is undergoing.
Id.
58. Id. § 2903.213.
59. Id.
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order is a. separate statutory offense. 60 If that violation caused physical
harm to the victim or the victim's property, or caused the victim to believe
that such harm would result, the court has the authority to confine the
accused stalker until it completes a mental evaluation.
6'
Iowa's provisions for denying stalkers bail are more limited than those
of Illinois or Ohio. First, Iowa makes no provision for denial of bail before
trial; the Iowa law is restricted to those defendants already convicted of
stalking who are awaiting sentencing or who are appealing. 62 Second, while
the statute presumes the convicted stalker is ineligible for bail, the court
may release the stalker if it determines that the release will not result in a
failure to appear at subsequent proceedings and will 'not jeopardize the
safety of others.63 Third, the presumption of ineligibility for bail applies
only to a third or subsequent stalking offense. 64 After a first or second
1
60. Id. § 2903.214. Violation of an anti-stalking protection order with no previous
convictions for stalking is a fourth degree misdemeanor; violation with one previous stalking
conviction is a first degree misdemeanor; violation with two or more previous stalking
convictions is a fourth degree felony. Id.
61. Id. § 2903.215. Section 2903.215 reads in part:
(A) If a defendant is charged with a violation of [an anti-stalking protection order]
or of a municipal ordinance that is substantially similar to that section, and if the
court determines that the violation of the anti-stalking protection order allegedly
involves conduct by the defendant that caused physical harm to the person or
property of the person covered by the order or conduct by the defendant that caused
the person covered by the order to believe that the defendant would cause physical
harm to that person or his property, the court may order an evaluation of the
mental condition of the defendant. The evaluation shall be completed no later than
thirty days from the date the order is entered ...
(C)(1) The court may order a defendant who has been released on bail to submit to
an examination .... If such a defendant refuses to submit to an examination or a
complete examination as required by the court or the center, program, facility, or
examiners involved, the court may amend the conditions of the bail of the defendant
and order the sheriff to take him into custody.., for purposes of the examination.
Id. i
62. IowA CODE ANm. § 811.1 (West Supp. 1993). Section 811.1 reads in part:
[A] defendant awaiting judgment of conviction and sentencing following either a
plea or verdict of guilty of, or appealing a conviction of ... [a third or subsequent
offense for stalking] is presumed to be ineligible to be admitted to bail unless the
court determines that such release reasonably will not result in the person falling to




64. Id. § 811.1(3). Section 811.1(3) reads in part:
While the presumption of ineligibility for bail ... shall not apply to a ... [first or
second stalking offense], in considering ball for a defendant awaiting judgment of
conviction and sentencing following a plea or verdict of guilty of, or appealing a
conviction of a ... [first or second stalking offense], the court shall consider the
likelihood of the defendant reestablishing contact with the victim of the violation.
Id. The Iowa statute does not specify whether the previous stalking convictions must have
involved the same victim.
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stalking conviction, however, the court must consider the likelihood of the
convicted stalker's re-establishing contact with the victim when deciding on
bail.
61
Massachusetts's stalking law says nothing about denying an accused
stalker bail.66 However, it does limit the accused stalker's pretrial activity
through its provision prohibiting any "continuance without a finding."6 7
That phrase describes a common Massachusetts trial court practice in which
a judge will postpone a case for a lengthy period of time, typically a year,
without making a finding that the accused is guilty.6 8 The judge usually will
impose certain conditions on the defendant; if the defendant complies with
the conditions during the continuance, the court dismisses the complaint or
indictment.69 This form of informal pretrial diversion allows the defendant
to avoid a criminal conviction (and the resulting punishment) and allows
the Commonwealth to save prosecutorial resources by avoiding a trial.
70
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has approved the trial courts'
use of this technique as an effort to help reduce court backlogs.
71
Massachusetts's stalking law, however, prohibits using this practice in
the case of an accused stalker who is a repeat offender or who has violated
an injunction or restraining order.7 This prohibition is intended to protect
the victim by limiting the stalker's opportunity to engage in stalking behavior
while waiting for trial.73
IV. FLoRDA AND Omo: ARREST WrrHouT WARRANT
The state of Florida has enacted what journalists have described as the
toughest anti-stalking law in the nation. 74 Although modeled on the Cali-
fornia statute, Florida's law is much more severe. Stalking, defined as
willful, malicious, and repeated following or harassment, is a misdemeanor;
the stalker is not required to make any threats against or to intentionally
scare the victim. 75 Stalking coupled with a credible threat intended to scare
the victim or in violation of an injunction is aggravated stalking, a third
65. Id.
66. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1993).
67. See A Turnabout on Stalkers, BosToN GLOBE, May 28, 1992, at 16 (describing details
of Massachusetts's stalking law).
68. See Commonwealth v. Duquette, 438 N.E.2d 334, 338 (Mass. 1982) (explaining
practice of "continuance without a finding"); Rosenberg v. Commonwealth, 360 N.E.2d 333,
335 n.5 (Mass. 1977) (same).
69. Duquette, 438 N.E.2d at 338; Rosenberg, 360 N.E.2d at 336 n.5.
70. Duquette, 438 N.E.2d at 340-41.
71. See id. at 341 (approving trial courts' use of continuance without finding).
72. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 43(b) (West Supp. 1993).
73. A Turnabout on Stalkers, supra note 67, at 16.
74. See Karen Branch, Stalkers to Face Jail for Harassment, MIA HERALD, July 1,
1992, at 6B (describing details of Florida's stalking law); Resnick, supra note 5, at 3 (explaining
background behind Florida's stalking law).
75. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993); see infra note 130 (giving edited text
of Florida's stalking statute).
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degree felony punishable by up to five years in prison and a $5000 fine. 76
The most controversial part of the Florida stalking law is its provision
for arrest without warrant. 7 The statute authorizes a police officer to arrest
without a warrant any person the officer has probable cause to believe has
stalked .7 However, other Florida law requires a warrant for an arrest on a
misdemeanor not committed in the officer's presence, 79 with some specific
exceptions for acts of domestic violence. s0 Stalking is not currently one of
those enumerated exceptions, making it appear that the two statutes are in
conflict.
Ohio's stalking legislation contains a similar provision for arrest without
judicial determination of probable cause.8' A police officer has authority to
arrest anyone the officer has probable cause to believe is guilty of stalking.8
A written statement by the alleged victim qualifies as sufficient probable
cause for the arrest.
8 3
V. MISCELLANEOUS DEPARTURES FROM THE CALIFORNIA MODEL
Although the influence of the California stalking statute has been
extensive, some states have enacted interesting departures from its provi-
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(3),(4); id. §§ 775.082 -.084.
77. See Beck supra note 10, at 61 (quoting Miami criminal defense attorney Jeffrey
Weiner's allegation that arrest without warrant provision is unconstitutional); Puente, supra
note 11, at 9A (quoting Senator Cohen of Maine relaying criticism of Florida's arrest without
warrant provision).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(5). "Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a
warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of
this section." Id.
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15. Section 901.15 reads in part:
A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when:
(1) The person has committed a felony or misdemeanor or violated a municipal or
county ordinance in the presence of the officer. An arrest for the commission of a
misdemeanor or the violation of a municipal or county ordinance shall be made
immediately or in fresh pursuit.
Id.
80. Id. § 901.15(6)-(8).
81. See New Law Makes Stalking A Crime, CLEvELAND PLAt DEALER, Aug. 8, 1992,
at 2C (explaining provisions of Ohio's stalking law).
82. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (Baldwin Supp. 1992). Section 2935.03(b) reads in
part:
When there is reasonable ground to believe that . . . the offense of menacing by
stalking ... has been committed ... [the police officer] may arrest and detain until
a warrant can be obtained any person whom he has reasonable cause to believe is
guilty of the violation. For purposes of this division, the execution of a written
statement by a person alleging that an alleged offender has committed the offense
of ... menacing by stalking ... constitutes reasonable ground to believe that ...
the person alleged to have committed the offense is guilty of the violation.
Id. The section also gives police the authority to make an arrest without a warrant for child
enticement, public indecency, and domestic violence. Id.
83. Id.
1314
1993] ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION 1315
sions. In addition to the prohibition of continuance without a finding
discussed above,4 Massachusetts's stalking law provides for mandatory
minimum sentences for convicted stalkers.85 A stalker who violates a re-
straining order or an injunction faces a mandatory minimum prison term
of one year; 6 a repeat offender must serve a two year mandatory minimum.1
7
The statute does not allow reduced or suspended sentences, probation,
parole, work releases, or furloughs for stalkers serving mandatory minimum
sentences."
West Virginia has placed an unusual and arguably unnecessary restriction
in its stalking law. The accused stalker formerly must have lived with or
had an intimate relationship with the victim to be convicted of the crime. 9
A person who stalks a neighbor, acquaintance, celebrity, or any other
person with whom the stalker has had no intimate relationship could not
be prosecuted under the present statute.
Three states have exceptions in their stalking laws to allow private
detectives to conduct surveillance. Delaware and Washington make express
exceptions for private detectives ° Tennessee describes the exception as
"following another person during the course of a lawful business activity." 9'
Two states require previous action by the victim before authorities may
charge the assailant with stalking. Nebraska requires the victim to obtain a
temporary restraining order, injunction, or no-contact order against the
accused stalker.9 2 North Carolina requires the victim to warn or ask the
stalker to stop.93
Connecticut emphasizes the protection of children in its stalking law by
imposing a harsher penalty on those who stalk minors.Y Stalking an adult
is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in prison.95 Stalking a
84. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text (discussing prohibition on continuance
without finding in Massachusetts's stalking law).
85. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1993).
86. Id. § 43(b).
87. Id. § 43(c).
88. Id.
89. W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1992). Section 61-2-9a reads in part:
(a) Any person who shall intentionally and closely follow, lie in wait, or make
repeated threats to cause bodily injury to any person with whom that person formerly
resided or cohabited or with whom that person formerly engaged in a sexual or
intimate relationship, with the intent to cause or causing said person emotional
distress or placing said person in fear of his or her personal safety shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor ....
Id. (emphasis added).
90. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(3)
(West Supp. 1993).
91. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992).
92. NEB. REa. STAT. § 28-311.03 (Supp. 1992).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (Supp. 1992).
94. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181c (West Supp. 1993); see also Spencer, supra note
7, at 1 (discussing New York's and Connecticut's stalking laws).
95. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181d; id. § 53a-36.
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victim under the age of sixteen is a felony, punishable by up to five years
in prison. 96
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STALKING LAWS
Because the vast majority of states have enacted their stalking laws only
recently, cases challenging the constitutionality of those laws are still at the
trial court level and have not yet reached the appellate courts. 9 7 Some
authorities, however, argue that the laws are constitutionally vulnerable."
These vulnerabilities derive from overbroad or vague language, statutory
presumptions, preventive detention, misdemeanor arrests without a warrant,
and mandatory minimum sentences.
A. Overbreadth
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amend-
ment needs "breathing space" to ensure that people are not afraid to
exercise their rights of expression because of the threat of criminal penalty.99
The overbreadth doctrine states that a law intended to punish conduct or
speech not protected by the First Amendment must be carefully drawn so
it will not incidentally inhibit constitutionally protected expression.' ® The
Supreme Court, however, generally will not find a law that proscribes
constitutionally unprotected activity overbroad unless its potential applica-
tion to First Amendment activities is substantial.10' Additionally, in evalu-
96. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181c; id. § 53a-35a.
97. The first constitutional challenges to stalking laws have occurred in Florida, Illinois,
and Virginia. See George Lardner Jr., Anti-Stalking Laws Proliferate; Several Face Court
Challenges, WASH. PosT, Apr. 30, 1993, at A2 (discussing early challenges to stalking laws in
Florida, Illinois, and Virginia).
98. See Kiley Armstrong, Tortured Suitors, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 12, 1992, at 3
(relaying Columbia Law School Vice Dean Vivian Berger's concern that anti-stalking laws may
infringe on free speech and movement); Kolarik, supra note 11, at 36 (quoting George
Washington University Law Professor Jonathan Turley's criticism that many new stalking laws
are unconstitutionally vague); Puente, supra note 11, at 9A (quoting American Civil Liberties
Union spokesman Phil Gutis that vague stalking laws may infringe on civil liberties); Ross,
supra note 7, at 6 (quoting ACLU director of public education Loren Siegel that new stalking
laws may be overly broad); Schiesel, supra note 16, at 5 (quoting Senator William S. Cohen
of Maine that new stalking statutes may be unconstitutionally overbroad).
99. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 521 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
100. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972) (explaining principles
behind overbreadth doctrine); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520-22 (same). A statute that imposes a
direct restriction on First Amendment activity is more susceptible to challenge for overbreadth.
See Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 967-68 (1984)
(explaining relaxed standing requirements for facial overbreadth challenges). See generally Note,
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAiv. L. REv. 844 (1970).
101. See Munson, 467 U.S. at 964-65 (explaining criterion of "substantial overbreadth");
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 (stating that statute's potentially unconstitutional applications must
be substantial when compared to its legitimate uses in order for statute to be void for
overbreadth); Gormley v. Director, 449 U.S. 1023, 1024 (1980) (White, J.; dissenting) (arguing
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ating overbreadth challenges the Court distinguishes between speech and
conduct, showing more deference to those laws which proscribe conduct
rather than speech.lea
California's overbreadth analysis is similar to that of the federal courts.
California courts generally will uphold a statute challenged as overbroad if
its terms are reasonably susceptible to a constitutional interpretation. 103 A
reviewing court will attempt to construe the challenged law so as to limit
its effect to actions the state may regulate or prohibit. 104 Additionally, a
California court will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is
substantially overbroad, particularly when the law regulates conduct rather
than speech. 05 Thus, a statute directed primarily at the regulation of conduct
that incidentally impinges on First Amendment rights is generally safe from
challengeY'0
In attempting to predict the constitutionality of California's stalking
law, it is difficult to discern a clear pattern in the California courts' recent
overbreadth analyses of similar harassment and threat statutes. However,
the distinction between speech and conduct appears to be the critical factor.
Recent case law suggests that a court is more likely to find unconstitutional
statutes that regulate activity the court decides is "speech."' ' 7 Laws prohib-
Connecticut telephone harassment statute was potentially overbroad because it clearly prohibited
some constitutionally protected communications); see also LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AmERicAl
CoNsrrrtnoNA LAw § 12-27 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe suggests that an overbreadth
challenge can be successful only when protected activity is a significant part of the law's target
and there is no way of severing the law's unconstitutional applications from its legitimate
ones. Id.
102. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 (noting distinction between speech and conduct in
overbreadth analysis); see also Note, supra note 10, at 530 n.l15 (listing state court decisions
distinguishing between speech and conduct in overbreadth analysis).
103. See Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119, 1129 (Cal.
1985) (reviewing rules of California overbreadth analysis); Welton v. City of L.A., 556 P.2d
1119, 1123 (Cal. 1976) (same).
104. Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1129; Welton, 556 P.2d at 1123.
105. See In re Duncan, 234 Cal. Rptr 877, 884 (Ct. App.) (upholding child sexual
exploitation statute against overbreadth challenge), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 985 (1987).
106. Welton, 556 P.2d at 1124.
107. Ketchens v. Reiner, 239 Cal. Rptr. 549, 552 (Ct. App. 1987). In Ketchens, a California
Court of Appeal held that laws making it a misdemeanor to insult or abuse a teacher in front
of students were unconstitutionally overbroad. The Ketchens court determined that the statutes
punished "pure speech." Id. While the court admitted that many abusive statements made to
a teacher would qualify as unprotected "fighting words," it also presented hypothetical
expressions of opinion about a teacher that did not. Id. Because the ordinances could possibly
prohibit protected speech, and because their defect could not be cured by a narrow judicial
construction, they were unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 553. In In re Elias, another
California Court of Appeal held the state's telephone harassment statute to be unconstitutionally
overbroad. 252 Cal. Rptr. 348, 355 (Ct. App. 1988). Because of the telephone's primary
purpose of disseminating speech, the Elias court focused on the statute's effect on speech
rather than conduct. Id. at 353. Like the Ketchens court, the Elias court provided examples
of constitutionally protected speech that would be illegal under the law. Id. at 352.
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iting activity that the reviewing court sees as "conduct" will survive the
overbreadth challenge. 10
When reviewed under the overbreadth criteria developed by the United
States Supreme Court and the California courts, California's stalking statute
is most likely not unconstitutionally overbroad.' 9 The wording of the statute
suggests that the California legislature specifically designed the law to
regulate conduct and not speech, 10 making it more likely a reviewing court
would uphold the law. Additionally, the statute specifies i intent and types
of prohibited behavior."' Finally, constitutionally protected activity is not
a significant target of the law; in fact, the statute specifically exempts
"constitutionally protected activity" from prohibition as stalking conduct."2
California's anti-stalking statute gives the appearance of a law carefully
drafted to defeat overbreadth challenges.
In contrast to California, the new stalking provisions of Colorado's
harassment statute may be vulnerable to charges of overbreadth.13 Over-
breadth analysis in the Colorado courts begins with the determination of
whether the challenged statute regulates protected or unprotected speech." 4
Statutes that directly regulate or substantially impair constitutionally pro-
tected speech are facially overbroad.' 5 If the court cannot place a limiting
108. People v. Hernandez, 283 Cal. Rptr. 81 (Ct. App. 1991). In Hernandez, a Court of
Appeal upheld the amended version of the telephone harassment statute invalidated in Elias.
This time the reviewing court decided the amended statute prohibited conduct rather than
speech, and applied the more deferential "substantially overbroad" language from Broadrick
v. Oklahoma. Hernandez, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84.
In People v. Hudson, the same court that decided Hernandez held the California statute
prohibiting terrorist threats was not overbroad. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Ct. App. 1992). While
the Hudson court did not explicitly categorize the prohibited activity as conduct rather than
speech, the language of the opinion suggests the court saw a "terroristic threat" as closer to
an act like assault than a form of expression. Id. at 693.
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); see supra note 19 (quoting partial text
of California's stalking law).
110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9.
111. Id.
112. Id. § 646.9(e).
113. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp. 1992); see Carl Hilliard, More Than 80 Laws
Take Effect July 1, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, June 22, 1992, at 12 (discussing new stalking
section of Colorado's harassment law); John Sanko, Police Get New Weapon, RocKy MouN-
TAiN NEws, June 5, 1992, at 33 (same).
114. Hansen v. People, 548 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo. 1976). Unprotected speech includes
obscenity, libel, incitement, invasion of substantial privacy interests of the home, and "fighting
words." Id. at 1281; People ex rel VanMeveren v. County Court, 551 P.2d 716, 718 (Colo.
1976). Some Colorado case law has also suggested that attempting to force another person to
submit to an unwanted association is unprotected activity under the First Amendment. People
in re C.S.M., 570 P.2d 229, 230 (Colo. 1977).
115. See VanMeveren, 551 P.2d at 719 (holding section of Colorado harassment statute
that made it illegal to repeatedly insult, taunt, or challenge another in manner likely to provoke
violent or disorderly response not facially overbroad because it was limited to "fighting
words"); Hansen, 548 P.2d at 1281 (holding Colorado disorderly conduct statute that made
it illegal to make coarse and offensive utterance in public facially overbroad because it was
not limited to "fighting words").
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construction on the statute to cure its overbreadth, it will declare the law
unconstitutional.1 16 When the statute is not facially overbroad, however, a
defendant can raise a charge of overbreadth only if the law is unconstitu-
tional as applied to the defendant's conduct.1 17 A defendant whose activity
is at the core of the interests the facially valid statute seeks to protect
cannot attack the statute as overbroad 18
The new stalking section of Colorado's harassment statute makes it
illegal to make any form of communication with another person in connec-
tion with a credible threat.119 A Colorado court might see this new section
as a facially overbroad direct regulation of constitutionally protected speech,
though a "credible threat" most likely would qualify as unprotected activity
like invasion of a privacy interest or fighting words. Even if the Colorado
legislature intended the stalking provisions to proscribe only unprotected
speech, whether the phrase "any form of communication" is drawn narrowly
enough to proscribe only that speech is doubtful.1 20 It is clearly possible for
constitutionally protected speech to fall under the language of the statute.
For example, a striking union worker's taunts toward an incoming nonunion
replacement might qualify as stalking in Colorado. Unlike California's
stalking statute,12 1 Colorado has no disclaimers for labor picketing or other
constitutionally protected activity. In the past the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado has struck down language in the state's harassment statute the court
felt was not narrowly tailored.' " Given the court's critical view of the
116. Hansen, 548 P.2d at 1281.
117. See People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo. 1988) (explaining standing
requirements for overbreadth challenges); People v. Weeks, 591 P.2d 91, 94 (Colo. 1979)
(same).
118. McBurney, 750 P.2d at 918; Weeks, 591 P.2d at 94.
119. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp. 1992). Section 18-9-111(4) reads in part:
[A] person commits harassment by stalking if such person:
(I) Makes a credible threat to another person and, in connection with such threat,
repeatedly follows.that person; or
(II) Makes a credible threat to another person and, in connection with such threat,
repeatedly makes any form of communication with that person, whether or not a
conversation ensues.
(b) For the purposes of this subsection, "credible threat" means a threat that would
cause a reasonable person to be in fear for the person's life or safety, and
"repeatedly" means on more than one occasion.
Id.
120. Id.
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e),(g) (West Supp. 1993).
122. Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 82-83 (Colo. 1975). In Bolles, the Court held that
section 1(e) of the harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 82-83. That
section had prohibited communication intended to harass, annoy, or alarm which was made
"in a manner likely to harass or cause alarm." Id. at 81. The Bolles court focused its analysis
on the words "annoy" and "alarm," determining that while the statute might punish obscene,
libelous, or riotous communications, one could also be guilty of harassment if he communicated
a storm warning or unpopular political message. Id. at 83. Because the statute could be used
to punish constitutionally protected speech, it was overbroad. Id.
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harassment statute in the past, 123 the language of the new stalking provisions
is potentially overbroad. 124
Florida's stalking statute also is potentially overbroad.'2 Like other
courts, the Supreme Court of Florida has made a distinction between speech
and conduct in its overbreadth analysis; statutes regulating conduct must
be "substantially overbroad" to be invalid. 126 In reviewing overbreadth
challenges to statutes prohibiting harassment and similar conduct, the Su-
preme Court of Florida has favored narrowly tailored statutes with time,
place, and manner restrictions that avoid bringing constitutionally protected
activity within the scope of the statute's prohibitions. 27 More importantly,
the court also prefers statutes requiring an intent to harass by the defendant
and a lack of consent by the victim.2s
This precedent makes the language of the Florida stalking law vulnerable
to charges of overbreadth 29 The statute makes it a crime to willfully follow
or harass another person. 130 With the statute written in the disjunctive,
123. See id. at 82-83; People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1985) (holding another
section of Colorado harassment statute to be unconstitutionally vague).
124. For a different view of the Colorado stalking legislation, see Thomas, supra note
10, at 132 n.30 (suggesting that Colorado law is safe from charges of vagueness and
overbreadth).
125. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993).
126. See Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (Fla.) (holding that statutes punishing
only speech are subject to stricter scrutiny), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 874 (1980); State v. Elder,
382 So. 2d 687, 690 (Fla. 1980) (quoting language from Broadrick that statute prohibiting
conduct must be substantially overbroad).
127. See State v. Keaton, 371 So. 2d 86, 92 (Fla. 1979) (holding telephone obscenity
statute overbroad due to lack of requirement that there be an unwilling' listener); McCall v.
State, 354 So. 2d 869, 872 (Fla. 1978) (holding statute that made it illegal to upbraid, abuse,
or insult teacher unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to exclude constitutionally
protected speech).
128. Compare Elder, 382 So. 2d at 691 (holding telephone harassment statute not over-
broad because it contained requirements for improper intent and nonconsensual contact) with
Keaton, 371 So. 2d at 92 (holding obscenity section of same statute overbroad because
proscription was not limited to unwilling listener).
129. For a short discussion of the potential constitutional problems in the Florida stalking
statute, see Thomas, supra note 10, at 130-33.
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048. Section 784.048 reads:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Harasses" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person
that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate
purpose.
(b) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Consti-
tutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of
conduct." Such constitutionally protected activity includes picketing or other organ-
ized protests.
(c) "Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent to cause the person who
is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must
be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person.
(2) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another
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either action qualifies as stalking behavior. As has California in its stalking
statute, 31 the Florida legislature carefully has defined the term "harasses"
to require the causing of emotional distress and a lack of legitimate purpose
and to exclude picketing and other constitutionally protected activity.1
32
Unlike California, however, Florida has not limited the term "follows."
The Florida law does not require that the following stalker threaten or
intend to harass the victim or follow without consent. 33 Additionally, no
restrictions exist as to when, where, or how the following must take place
to qualify as stalking.'3 Following is most accurately characterized as
conduct rather than speech, so any statute regulating that activity must be
substantially overbroad for a court to strike it down. Florida appellate
courts have found other statutes regulating conduct overbroad, however,
because they were not narrowly tailored. 35 They may view the stalking
statute the same way.
36
B. Vagueness
It is a principle of due process that a law is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined. 37 A criminal statute is unconstitutionally
vague if persons of "common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.' 38 The purpose of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is to ensure that laws provide fair warning of prohibited
conduct, set clear standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree ....
(3) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another
person, and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable
fear of death or bodily injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony
of the third degree ....
(4) Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence...
or domestic violence ... or after any other court-imposed prohibition of conduct
toward the subject person or that person's property, knowingly, willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of aggravated
stalking, a felony of the third degree ....
(5) Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, any person he or
she has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of this section.
Id.
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993).
132. FLA. STAT. Ar. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See News-Press Publishing Co. v. Firestone, 527 So. 2d 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (holding statute restricting nonvoter access within 50 feet of polling place to be
unconstitutionally overbroad).
136. A Florida trial court has already decided the state's stalking law is overbroad. See
Defense Wins Challenge To State's Anti Stalking Law, MLIA HERALD, Mar. 9, 1993, at 2BR
(detailing initial overbreadth challenge to Florida stalking law).
137. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (explaining void-for-
vagueness doctrine).
138. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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ment by police and courts, and do not inhibit the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights. 13 9 While precise tests for vagueness do not emerge from the
case law,' 4° void-for-vagueness challenges are most successful when the
persons challenging the law consulted the statute in advance and then relied
on their interpretation of the unclear law,1 41 and it clearly was possible for
the legislature to have drafted the law more precisely. 42 Because vagueness
is not calculable with precision, the Supreme Court ordinarily will not
invalidate a statute because its language covers some extreme hypothetical
situations. 1
43
In California the courts require only reasonable certainty to survive a
vagueness challenge. 44 A statute must be definite enough to provide a
standard of conduct for those whose activity it proscribes as well as a
standard for the courts to ascertain guilt. 14 The reviewing court, however,
is not obligated to consider every conceivable situation that might arise
under the language of the statute. 1' In order to succeed in a vagueness
challenge to a statute that does not threaten First Amendment rights, the
party must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all its
applications. 147 When a law potentially impacts First Amendment rights,
however, the Supreme Court of California requires greater precision.
4
8
In evaluating the stalking law for vagueness, the California legislature
appears to have learned from its earlier mistakes. In contrast to the terrorism
statute found void for vagueness in People v. Mirmirani149 stalking cannot
139. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; WA.Tm
R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRaMNAL. LAW § 2.3(a) (2d ed. 1986); TRIE, supra note
101, § 12-31. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960) [hereinafter Void-for-Vagueness]. While the doctrines of vagueness
and overbreadth are both concerned with ensuring freedom of expression, vagueness is
specifically concerned with the effects that imprecise laws and arbitrary enforcement will have
on such expression. See Note, supra note 10, at 529 n.111 (explaining difference between
overbreadth and vagueness).
140. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 139, § 2.3(a); Note, supra note 10, at 529.
141. See Void-for-Vagueness, supra note 139, at 87 n.98 and cases collected therein.
142. United States v: Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
143. See United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (holding
federal law making it illegal to sell goods at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor" not to be void for vagueness); United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617-18 (1954) (holding Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act,
which required reports to Congress from persons receiving contributions or spending money
for purpose of influencing legislation, was not too vague to meet requirements of due process).
144. People v. Buice, 40 Cal. Rptr. 877, 885 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
145. People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 893 (Cal. 1984).
146. See In re John V., 213 Cal. Rptr. 503, 508 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that statute
that made it illegal to use offensive words in public place which are inherently likely to provoke
immediate violent reaction was not void for vagueness).
147. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 592 (Cal. 1988).
148. See People v. Mirmirani, 636 P.2d 1130, 1134-35 (Cal. 1981) (holding California
"terrorism" statutes void for vagueness); Ketchens v. Reiner, 239 Cal. Rptr. 549, 553 (Ct.
App. 1987) (holding laws making it illegal to upbraid, insult, or abuse public school teacher
void for vagueness).
149. 636 P.2d 1130 (Cal. 1981). In Mirmirani, the Supreme Court of California held that
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consist of pure speech. Stalking in California requires following or harassing
the victim in addition to any communicated threat.15 0 Additionally, the
legislature has defined carefully what it means by "harass" and "threat.'
'151
These definitions convey adequate warning as to what conduct is prohibited.
California's stalking law provides sufficient guidance to both potential
offenders and law enforcement officials and should survive any vagueness
challenges.
In Virginia, a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if its terms, when
measured by common understanding and practices, sufficiently warn a
person as to what behavior the law prohibits. 15 2 The standard for measuring
vagueness is not fixed; because criminal statutes bring more severe penalties
than civil statutes, Virginia courts are less tolerant if the former are
imprecise.' If the statute does not threaten First Amendment rights, the
defendant may challenge the law's guidelines for vagueness only as they
apply to the defendant. The court will not evaluate the law based on how
it might apply in some hypothetical situation. 5 4 The burden is on the
challenger to demonstrate the vagueness, and the reviewing court may
construe the statute to have a limited application if such a construction will
make the law constitutional. 5 Like other states, Virginia appellate courts
also seem more willing to sustain vagueness challenges when the law threat-
the state's "terrorism" statutes were unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1138. Those laws had
made it a felony to terrorize another by threatening death or injury in an effort to achieve
"social or political" goals. Id. at 1133 n.5. The Mirmirani court initially decided that the
crime could consist of pure speech and thus was subject to stricter standards for vagueness.
Id. at 1135. The court focused its analysis on the phrase "social or political goals," determining
the phrase to be all-inclusive because it was impossible to determine what conduct could not
in some way be construed as an attempt to achieve a social or political goal. Id. The Mirmirani
court felt that the phrase was too vague to provide guidance to citizens, police, or judges and
juries. Id. at 1136. Because the phrase "social or political goals" was vital to the statute, its
vagueness invalidated the entire law. Id. at 1138.
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9. At the time of Mirmirani, section 422.5 of the California
Penal Code read: "terrorize means to create a climate of fear and intimidation by means of
threats or violent action causing sustained fear for personal safety in order to achieve social
or political goals." Mirmirani, 636 P.2d at 1133-34 n.5. Section 646.9(a) says: "Any person
who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes
a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great
bodily injury ... is guilty of the crime of stalking."
151. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9. "'Harasses' means a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or terrorizes
the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose." Id. § 646.9(e). "'A credible threat' means
a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause
the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety." Id.
§ 646.9(0.
152. Stein v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 238, 241 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
153. Jackson v. W., 419 S.E.2d 385, 392 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); Turner v. Jackson, 417
S.E.2d 881, 889 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
154. See Jackson v. W., 419 S.E.2d at 391 (evaluating vagueness challenge to child abuse
guidelines on as-applied basis); Turner v. Jackson, 417 S.E.2d at 888 (same).
155. Perkins v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 229, 233 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); Coleman v.
City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 241 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
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ens First Amendment rights of expression or assembly. 15 6 Statutes requiring
a specific intent appear to be less susceptible to vagueness charges.1
7
Despite this precedent, Virginia's stalking law15 is potentially void for
vagueness.5 9 Although the statute requires a specific intent, it does not
specify clearly what conduct it prohibits. Under the language of the statute,
any conduct intended to cause emotional distress through a fear of death
or injury qualifies as stalking.60 Unlike other states, Virginia has not
specified what kinds of conduct (harassment, following, threats, or intimi-
dation, for example) must accompany this criminal intent. 16' Virginia's
stalking law essentially proscribes any conduct intended to scare. In the
language of a Virginia appellate court opinion describing an earlier vague
statute, "[t]he public is not adequately apprised of the behavior that is
proscribed .... If no particular act is proscribed, those wishing to conform
to the ordinance do not know what conduct to avoid."162 By focusing on
the victim's reaction rather than the assailant's conduct, the Virginia legis-
lature has made its stalking law vulnerable to challenge for vagueness.163
The same language that makes Florida's stalking law potentially
overbroad'4 also creates vagueness problems. Any person who willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person is potentially
guilty of stalking in Florida. 65 With the statute written in the disjunctive,
either harassment or following alone can qualify as stalking. Because the
term "follows" is not defined or limited, it may be difficult for both
citizens and the courts to determine exactly when following becomes stalk-
156. Compare Coleman, 364 S.E.2d at 243-44 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (holding city ordinance
making it illegal to loiter in public place under circumstances manifesting intent to engage in
prostitution to be void-for-vagueness) with Stein, 402 S.E.2d at 241 (holding extortion statute
not to be vague).
157. See Perkins, 402 S.E.2d at 234 (holding telephone harassment statute requiring intent
to coerce, intimidate, or harass not to be unconstitutionally vague).
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1992). Section 18.2-60.3 reads in part:
"Any person who on more than one occasion engages in conduct with the intent to cause
emotional distress to another person by placing that person of reasonable fear of death or
bodily injury shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor." Id.
159. See Laurence Hammack, Stalker Given 6 Months in Jail, ROANOKE TnmES & WoRLD-
NEws, Oct. 17, 1992, at 1, 2 (quoting statement by Assistant Public Defender Gerald Teaster
that Virginia stalking law may be vague).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3.
161. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (requiring
stalker to follow or place victim under surveillance in furtherance of threat); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 708.11 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring stalker to follow, pursue, or harass victim while making
credible threat).
162. Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 243-44 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
163. A Virginia trial court has already decided the state's stalking statute is unconstitu-
tionally vague. See Wynne Wooley, Stalking Law Ruled Invalid, RICH. TaMS-DISPATCH, Apr.
10, 1993, at 1.
164. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(2) (West Supp. 1993). For a discussion of the overbreadth
problems in Florida's stalking law, see supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
165. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(2).
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ing.'" The Florida Supreme Court has held that a statute must convey a
sufficiently definite warning as to what conduct it proscribes to survive a
vagueness challenge.167 Put another way, a Florida statute is unconstitution-
ally vague if "its language is so unclear or ambiguous that persons of
reasonable intelligence must guess at what conduct is proscribed.' ' 6 Its
imprecision makes the Florida stalking law potentially void for vagueness. 169
The language of Ohio's stalking law also appears vague because it does
not specify any prohibited conduct or required intent. 170 However, Ohio's
menacing law, the language of which suggests it was the model for the
stalking law,171 has been in effect for almost twenty years without any
record of vagueness challenges. 72 Based on Ohio court opinions construing
166. Early reports suggest police and prosecutors in Florida may also be confused as to
what constitutes stalking. One of the first people prosecuted under Florida's stalking law was
a 66 year old man who never threatened the victim but who called her repeatedly and appeared
uninvited at her door. Andy Friedburg, Elderly Man May Be First Charged Under Florida
Stalking Law, HouSToN CHRON., July 12, 1992, at 16. Another early case was a twelve year
old boy who followed a girl in his seventh-grade class. See Boy, 12, Accused as Stalker, N.Y.
Tnias, Dec. 17, 1992, at B21.
167. State v. Rodriquez, 365 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1978); Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d
669 (Fla. 1972).
168. State v. Cohen, 568 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. 1990) (quoting State v. Ferrari, 398 So. 2d
804, 807 (Fla. 1981)).
169. See Laura Griffin, Stalking Law Under Attack, ST. PERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 25,
1993, at 1B (discussing initial vagueness challenge to Florida stalking law); Laura Griffin,
Stalking Law Upheld, ST. PETERSBURG Tuss, Jan. 26, 1993, at 3B (same); Trevor Jensen,.
Lawyers Denied; Anti-Stalking Law Stands, FT. LAuDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, May 12, 1993,
at 3B (discussing later vagueness challenge to Florida stalking law).
170. Oo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (Baldwin Supp. 1992). Section 2903.211 says:
(A) No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another
to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause
mental distress to the other person.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of menacing by stalking, a misdemeanor
of the first degree. If the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty
to a violation of this section involving the same person who is the victim of the
current offense, menacing by stalking is a felony of the fourth degree.
(C) As used in this section:
(1) "Pattern of conduct" means two or more actions or incidents closely related in
time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those actions
or incidents.
(2) "Mental distress" means any mental illness or condition that involves some
temporary substantial incapacity or mental illness or condition that would normally
require psychiatric treatment.
Id.; See France Griggs, Experts Say Stalking Law Can Hurt Innocent People, CINc-NATI
PosT, June 24, 1993, at 10A (discussing early vagueness challenge to Ohio's stalking law).
171. Id. § 2903.22. Section 2903.22 reads:
(A) No person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause
physical harm to the person or property of such other person or member of his
immediate family.
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similar language, adding the phrase "engaging in a pattern of conduct" to
the menacing statute to create the stalking statute does not appear to make
it more vulnerable to vagueness charges. 73 Assuming that its menacing law
has survived for reasons other than oversight, Ohio's stalking law is most
likely not void for vagueness.
C. Presumption of Intent
Legislatures often create statutory presumptions in an effort to relieve
the prosecution of the burden of proving some fact that is difficult to
establish, such as the defendant's intent. 74 These statutory presumptions
may conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require-
ment that the state prove every essential element of a criminal offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 1
One type of statutory presumptions is a permissive inference. A per-
missive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion it may draw if
the state proves predicate facts, but it does not require the jury to draw
that conclusion.1 7 6 In testing the constitutionality of permissive inferences,
the Supreme Court has held that some rational basis for the inference must
exist in the facts already proven to the jury.' 77 In theory, the burden of
proof remains with the prosecution and the jury is free to accept or reject
the presumption.178 However, such an inference may disadvantage the ac-
cused by misleading the jury into believing it may convict solely upon proof
of the predicate fact, rather than taking into account all the surrounding
circumstances. 79
173. See State v. Brown, 528 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio 1988) (holding statute authorizing death
penalty when offense is part of course of conduct involving killing of two or more persons
not to be unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989); State v. Benner, 533
N.E.2d 701 (Ohio 1988) (holding course-of-conduct specification in rape murder statute not
to be void for vagueness), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
174. See LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 139, § 2.13 (discussing statutory presumptions).
175. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317 (1985) (holding jury instruction that "the
law presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" to be
unconstitutional burden shifting presumption on essential element of intent); Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (same); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975)
(holding Maine rule requiring murder defendant to prove he acted in heat of passion on
sudden provocation in attempting to reduce charge to manslaughter unconstitutional for shifting
burden of proof on element of intent); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (stating that
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged").
176. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314; County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
177. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314-15; Ulster, 442 U.S. at 157.
178. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. "A permissive inference does not relieve the State of its
burden of persuasion because it still requires the State to convince the jury that the suggested
conclusion should be inferred based on the predicate facts proved." Id; see also Ulster, 442
U.S. at 157 (stating that permissive inference does not shift burden of proof).
179. LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 139, § 2.13(b).
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A mandatory rebuttable presumption requires the jury to find the
presumed fact unless the defendant is able to persuade the jury that such
a finding is unwarranted.8 0 Such presumptions are unconstitutional if they
shift to the defendant the burden of persuasion on an element of the
offense, such as intent.""'
Michigan's stalking law uses a mandatory rebuttable presumption.
In that state, a stalker's continued harassment of a victim after being asked
to stop raises the presumption that the continued behavior caused the victim
to feel scared. 182 Moreover, causing the victim to feel scared is an essential
element of the offense.'83 The Supreme Court of Michigan has held such
mandatory rebuttable presumptions unconstitutional when used in jury
instructions where the presumed fact was a necessary element of the of-
fense.1 4 Because causation is an essential element of the offense, and because
the law provides for a mandatory rebuttable presumption of causation,
Michigan's stalking law appears to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause.
In the state of Washington, courts use a three part test for determining
the constitutionality of a statutory presumption in a criminal case: (1) the
presumption must not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion to the
defendant; (2) the presumed element must follow beyond a reasonable doubt
from the facts already proven; and (3) the court must inform the jury that
the presumption is permissive and not mandatory.' In determining whether
or not a presumption meets this test, the court may use its common
180. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.2. (1985).
181. See supra note 175 (listing cases that held mandatory rebuttable presumptions
unconstitutional because they shifted burden of proof on essential elements of offense).
182. MicH. Comp. LAws § 750.411h (Supp. 1993). Section 411h reads in part:
(4) In a prosecution for a violation of [stalking], evidence that the defendant
continued to engage in a course of conduct involving repeated unconsented contact
with the victim after having been requested by the victim to discontinue the same
or a different form of unconsented contact, and to refrain from any further
unconsented contact with the victim, shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the continuation of the course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
Id. (emphasis added). See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (explaining details of
Michigan's stalking law).
183. MIcH. Comp. LAws § 750.411h. Section 411h, paragraph (1)(d) reads: "'Stalking'
means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another
individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated,
threatened, harassed, or molested, and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested." Id. (emphasis added).
184. See People v. Woods, 331 N.W.2d 707, 720-21 (Mich. 1982) (holding jury instructions
that people normally are presumed to intend consequences of their acts to be unconstitutional
burden-shifting presumption on intent element of offense), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134 (1983);
People v. Wright, 289 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Mich. 1980) (holding jury instruction that intent is
presumed from doing of wrongful act to be unconstitutional).
185. See State v. Roberts, 562 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Wash. 1977) (defining Washington State
test for determining constitutionality of statutory presumptions); State v. Vandiver, 584 P.2d
978, 982-83 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (same).
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experience as well as empirical data and evidence." 6 Washington's "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard, applicable to both permissive inferences and
mandatory rebuttable presumptions, appears to be a stricter standard than
the "rational basis" test applied to permissive inferences by the United
States Supreme Court.
1 7
Washington's stalking statute contains a statutory presumption' that
uses language state appellate courts have found to create an unconstitutional
mandatory presumption in similar statutes. 1 9 Even if a Washington court
were to construe the language in the statute as raising a permissive inference
rather than a mandatory presumption, the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard still applies. 190 The presumption of an intent to intimidate or harass
would have to follow beyond a reasonable doubt from proof that the
accused stalker continued to contact or follow the victim after being asked
to stop. Most statutory presumptions reviewed by the Washington appellate
courts have failed to meet this "reasonable doubt" standard.' 9' With this
precedent, the statutory presumption in Washington's stalking law may not
withstand review by the state's supreme court.
t
D. Preventive Detention
In recent years preventive detention-the pretrial custody of a defendant
for the purpose of protecting some other person or the community at
large-has become increasingly popular.192 The federal Bail Reform Act of
1984, for example, permits the detention of arrestees charged with crimes
of violence, capital or life-imprisonment offenses, or serious drug offenses
if, after a hearing, the magistrate determines that "no condition or com-
186. Roberts, 562 P.2d at 1262; State v. Alcantara, 552 P.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Wash. 1976).
187. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's rational
basis test for permissive inferences).
188. WASH REv. CODE AN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993). Washington's new stalking
law concludes:
"(4) Attempts to contact or follow the person after being given actual notice that
the person does not want to be contacted or followed constitutes prima facie evidence
that the stalker intends to intimidate or harass the person."
Id.
189. See State v. Rogers, 520 P.2d 159, 161 (Wash.) (holding statutory presumption that
being armed constituted prima facie evidence of intent to commit crime of violence was
unconstitutional), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974); In re Gilbert, 617 P.2d 455, 457 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1980) (construing same statutory presumption as mandatory).
190. State v. Roberts, 562 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Wash. 1977).
191. See id. at 1262 (holding that jury instruction that killing without justification is
presumed to be second degree murder was invalid); State v. Alcantara, 552 P.2d 1049, 1052
(Wash. 1976) (holding statutory presumption of intent to commit larceny from mere failure
to return rental equipment was unconstitutional); Rogers, 520 P.2d at 161 (holding statutory
presumption of intent to commit crime of violence from fact of being armed was unconsti-
tutional); State v. Odom, 520 P.2d 152, 157 (Wash.) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1013
(1974).
192. See WALTER R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRU NAL PROCEDURE § 12.3(a) (2d




bination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 193
While no state has adopted a similar full-scale preventive detention scheme,
many states consider the defendant's dangerousness in the pretrial release
determination or deny bail entirely for defendants charged with certain
serious noncapital offenses. 19 Despite a number of potential constitutional
arguments against the procedure, 19 the Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of preventive detention statutes.
19
Under the Illinois Constitution, an accused person traditionally has had
the right to release on bail, with an exception for capital offenses. 197 The
Supreme Court of Illinois has been zealous in its defense of this right, 19
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1984).
194. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/110-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (allowing denial
of bail for capital offenses, offenses which carry life sentence, and stalking); OHio REv. CoDE
ANN. § 2903.212 (Baldwin Supp. 1992) (listing factors court must consider when deciding on
bail for accused stalker); see also LAFAvE & IsRA,,, supra note 192, § 12.3(a).
195. One argument against preventive detention is that the Eight Amendment's excessive
bail clause implies a constitutional right to bail. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (holding
that right to ball before trial is necessary to permit preparation of defense and to prevent
punishment prior to conviction). Another is that preventive detention is a violation of
substantive due process as a imposition of punishment before trial and conviction. In Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), however, the Supreme Court held that pretrial detention is not
automatically punishment. Id. at 537. It identified three factors in evaluating whether pretrial
detention is unconstitutional: (1) whether the detention is imposed as punishment or is incidental
to some other legitimate government purpose; (2) whether the detention has a rational
connection to the alternate purpose; and (3) whether the pretrial detention is excessive in
relation to the alternate purpose. Id. at 538. Third, it is arguable that pretrial detention is a
violation of procedural due process if the detention hearing does not adequately provide for
counsel, cross-examination, and presentation of evidence. See United States v. Edwards, 430
A.2d 1321 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding District of Columbia's preventive detention statute
against due process challenge), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
196. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). In Salerno, the Supreme Court upheld
the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984. Id. at 755. The defendant, Anthony "Fat Tony" Salerno,
a reputed captain in a Mafia crime family, had been confined before trial under the Act after
being indicted on federal racketeering charges. Id. at 743. Salerno challenged the pretrial
detention provisions as a violation of Fifth Amendment substantive due process and as excessive
bail under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 744.
Applying the factors from Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, the Court upheld the provisions as
permissible regulation rather than impermissible punishment. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-47. It
found that the government's interest in community safety outweighed the defendant's individual
liberty interest. Id. at 748. The Court also noted the care the Act took in limiting the
circumstances where detention would be allowed and the extensive procedural safeguards
provided. Id. at 750-52.
The Court also rejected the Eighth Amendment challenge. Following its holding in Carlson
v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), the Salerno Court interpreted the excessive ball clause as not
requiring release on bail under all circumstances. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753. Even more
significantly, the Court decided that bail could be denied for compelling reasons other than
the traditional one of preventing flight by the defendant. Id. at 754.
197. ILL. CONsr. art. II, § 7, amended by ILL. CoNsr. art. I, § 9. Prior to 1986, section
7 read: "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where
the proof is evident or the presumption great." Id.
198. See People ex rel. Hemingway v. Elrod, 322 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ill. 1975) (holding
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and, in dictum, has rejected the idea of preventive detention. '9 In the last
ten years, however, the Illinois legislature has amended the state constitution
and code of criminal procedure twice: first to deny the absolute right to
bail to defendants accused of crimes that carry a life sentence, and later to
deny an absolute right to bail to defendants accused of nonprobationable
felony offenses whose release would pose a threat to others.20° In conjunction
with the state's new stalking law, the legislature again has amended the
code-but not the state constitution-to allow courts to deny bail to those
accused of stalking. 201
Illinois state law, however, classifies stalking as a Class 4 felony2°2 and
aggravated stalking as a Class 3 felony.203 Both classes ' are eligible for
probation. 2 4 Under the Illinois Constitution, defendants accused of such
probationable felonies are bailable. 25 Given the Illinois Supreme Court's
strident protection of an accused's right to bail in the past, the court should
find the provisions for denying an accused stalker bail invalid under the
state constitution.2
Illinois' stalking legislation also includes provisions allowing the use of
illegally obtained evidence at the bail hearing.3 These should withstand
constitutional challenge. The United States Supreme Court has held that
pretrial hearings require fewer adversarial safeguards than al criminal trial.20
The Court also has approved the detention hearing procedures in the federal
Bail Reform Act, which, like those in the Illinois statute, exempt information
presented at the hearing from the rules governing admissibility of evidence
in criminal trials.2°9 Although the Court has not ruled explicitly on the use
that defendant charged with murder but not subject to death penalty was bailable under pre-
1986 state constitution); People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 237 N.E.2d 495 (Ill. 1968) (holding
that defendant convicted of forcible felony was eligible for bail pending appeal).
199. See Hemingway, 322 N.E.2d at 841 (refusing to adopt principle of preventive
detention); People v. Ealy, 365 N.E.2d 149, 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (citing Hemingway).
200. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 110-4(a):(Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992). Article I, § 9 replaced Article II, § 7 as the Illinois constitutional provision governing
bail.
201. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/110-4(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
202. Id. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3(b).
203. Id. ch. 730, para. 5/12-7.4(b).
204. Id. ch. 730, para. 5/5-5-3(c)(2).
205. ILL. CONST., art. I, § 9.
206. Illinois trial courts have already found the no-bail provision in violation of the state
constitution. See David Bailey, Appeals Court to Rule on Challenge to Stalking Law's No-
Bail Provision, Cm. DAmY L. BULL., Dec. 11, 1992, at 1 (discussing early challenge to Illinois
stalking law provision for denying accused stalkers ball); David Bailey, Circuit Judge Finds
No-Bail Provision of Stalking Law To Be Unconstitutional, Cm. DAmy L. BULL., Feb. 5,
1993 at 1; Susan Kuczka, Clause in Stalking Law Ruled Unconstitutional, Cm. Tam., Feb. 5,
1993, at NW3.
207. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/110-6.3(c)(1); see supra notes 52-53 and accom-
panying text (explaining admissibility of evidence at ball hearings for stalkers in Illinois).
208. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975) (holding that determination of
probable cause does not require adversary hearing or appointed counsel).
209. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987) (approving detention
hearing procedures of Ball Reform Act).
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of illegally obtained evidence at a bail hearing, it has approved the use of
such evidence in other pretrial proceedings. 210 Illinois' use of illegally ob-
tained evidence at an accused stalker's bail hearing should survive federal
court review.
Illinois courts have not approved the use of illegally obtained evidence
at bail hearings. However, statutes explicitly allowing the use of such
evidence at bail hearings for offenses other than stalking have survived
without any record of constitutional challenge since 1987.21 1 The statute
controlling denial of bail for accused stalkers uses language similar to the
previously enacted laws in its discussion on the use of illegally obtained
evidence. 212 Assuming the previously enacted statutes are valid, the Illinois
courts likely will uphold the use of illegally obtained evidence at bail hearings
for accused stalkers.
In Ohio, the state constitution dictates that all offenses other than
capital ones are bailable before trial.23 The Supreme Court of Ohio has
held that this right to bail is absolute.2 4 This absolute right to bail is more
extensive than that provided by the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment as interpreted in United States v. Salerno.215 Additionally,
according to the state's rules of criminal procedure, the purpose of bail in
Ohio is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at trial. 2 6 Bail conditions
unrelated to the defendant's trial appearance are considered excessive.
217
Given this strict precedent, whether Ohio's proposed stalking legislation
will survive state court scrutiny is questionable. The language of the section
on bail does not give the court the right to deny the accused stalker bail,
so it appears to comply with the letter of the state's constitution. 28 However,
the section does instruct the court to consider certain factors in setting the
amount and conditions of that bail, factors that include the accused's
210. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974) (approving use of illegally
obtained evidence in grand jury proceedings); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 484
(1958) (denying supp~ression of illegally obtained evidence at preliminary hearings).
211. ILL. STAT. ANr. ch. 725, paras. 5/110-6(f)(2), 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
212. Id. ch. 725, para. 5/110-6.3.
213. Owo CONST. art. I, § 9. Section 9 states: "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except for capital offenses where the proof is evident, or the presumption great.
Excessive bail shall not be required; nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual
punishments .inflicted." Id.
214. State ex rel Baker v. Troutman, 553 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ohio 1990); Locke v.
Jenkins, 253 N.E.2d 757, 757 (Ohio 1969); State v. Bevacqua, 67 N.E.2d 786, 788 (Ohio
1946).
215. 481 U.S. 739 (1987); see Commentary, Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of the State
of Ohio, Oio REV. CODE ANN. (Baldwin 1990) (discussing differences in right to bail under
United States and Ohio constitutions).
216. Omo Csium. R. 46(A) (Baldwin 1988).
217. See Troutman, 553 N.E.2d at 1056 (holding that bail conditioned on accused's
consent to forfeiting ball money for fines and costs excessive); Bevacqua, 67 N.E.2d at 788
(holding that keeping accused in jail by setting bail at excessive levels is unconstitutional).
218. Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.212 (Baldwin Supp. 1992).
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history of violence and the potential threat to the alleged victim or others.21 9
By making the dangerousness of the accused stalker a factor in determining
the amount and conditions of bail, Ohio's new stalking laws appear to be
in violation of the state's rules of criminal procedure as well as Ohio
Supreme Court precedent indicating that a court may use bail only to ensure
the appearance of the defendant at trial.
Iowa's provisions for denying bail to a stalker after a third conviction 220
should survive constitutional challenge. The United States Supreme Court
has held that a defendant has no constitutional right to bail pending appeal
from a conviction. 21 Additionally, the Iowa state constitution does not
require bail after conviction. 2 The Supreme Court of Iowa has interpreted
this provision of the state constitution to mean that any right to bail after
conviction is purely statutory and thus subject to change by legislative
action. 223 The recent statutory amendment which includes third-time stalking
among the offenses presumed to ineligible for bail after conviction appears
well within the Iowa legislature's authority.
The statute's provision making the stalker's threat to the victim a
mandatory factor in deciding on bail after a first or second conviction also
appears valid. The Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure suggest that the
decision on bail for a defendant pending appeal of a conviction is within
the discretion of the trial court.226 Under this standard, a trial court's
decision to deny bail to a convicted stalker based on the threat to the victim
will most likely be upheld.227
219. Id. An additional section of the new legislation allows a court to impose an anti-
stalking protection order that restricts the accused stalker's activity as a pre-trial release
condition. Id. § 2903.213.
220. IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.1 (West Supp. 1993); see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying
text (discussing denial of bail for convicted stalkers in Iowa).
221. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). See also Grady v. Iowa State Penitentiary,
346 F. Supp. 681, 683 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (holding that person in state custody does not have
Eighth Amendment right to bail pending appeal).
222. IowA CONST. art. 1, § 12. Section 12 reads in part: "All persons shall, before
conviction, be bailable, by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses where the proof is
evident, or the presumption great." Id. (emphasis added); see State v. Anderson, 338 N.W.2d
372, 375 (Iowa 1983) (holding that defendant has no post-conviction right to bail under Iowa
constitution); Emery v. Fenton, 266 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Iowa 1978) (same).
223. Anderson, 338 N.W.2d at 375; Emery, 266 N.W.2d at 7.
224. IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.1(3).
225. Id.
226. Id. § 813.2, Rule 23. Rule 23 of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure reads in
part:
(4)(d) Custody pending appellate determination. Pending determination by the ap-
pellate court of such appeal, the trial court shall determine whether the defendant
shall remain in custody, or whether, if in custody, the defendant should be released
on bail on his or her own recognizance.
Id. See also State v. Thomason, 285 N.W. 636 (Iowa 1939) (reviewing trial court's decision
on bail pending appeal under abuse of discretion standard).
227. See Grady v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 345 F. Supp. 681, 683 (N.D. Iowa 1972)




E. Misdemeanor Arrest Without Warrant
Under the common law, a police officer had the authority to make a
misdemeanor arrest without a warrant only when a defendant committed a
"breach of the peace" in the officer's presence.? States have expanded
this common-law rule to allow arrest without warrant for any misdemeanor
occurring in the officer's presence. 229 Additionally, courts have interpreted
"in the officer's presence" to mean that the officer may make the arrest if
the officer has probable cause to believe the defendant is committing the
.offense in the officer's presence. 2 0
In Florida, the general rule is that an officer may make a misdemeanor
arrest without a warrant only if the person has committed the offense in
the officer's presence.231 The officer must make the arrest immediately after
commission of the offense or in fresh pursuit of the defendant.2 2 Florida
courts have interpreted the rule as requiring the arresting officer to have
substantial reason to believe the person was committing the misdemeanor
in his presence; the officer must base that substantial reason on personal
observations.23 There are, however, a number of statutory exceptions to
the general rule. A law enforcement officer has the authority to arrest
without a warrant anyone the officer has probable cause to believe has
violated a protective injunction2 4 or committed an act of domestic violence
or child abuse. 25
228. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1975); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699, 713 (1948) (Vinson, J., dissenting); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156
(1925); LAFAvw & ISRA L, supra note 192, § 3.5(a).
229. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 192, § 3.5(a).
230. Id.
231. FLA. STAT. Am. § 901.15(l) (West Supp. 1993). Section 901.15 reads in part:
A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without warrant when:
(1) The person has committed a felony or misdemeanor or violated a municipal or
county ordinance in the presence of the officer. An arrest for the commission of a
misdemeanor or the violation of a municipal or county ordinance shall be made
immediately or in fresh pursuit.
Id. See also State v. Eldridge, 565 So. 2d 787, 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct- App. 1990) (holding that
presence requirement pertains to all misdemeanors); Johnson v. State, 395 So. 2d 594, 595
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that police officer is limited in making warrantless
misdemeanor arrests to offenses committed in his presence).
232. FLA. STAT. A'N. § 901.15(1).
233. See Malone V. Howell, 192 So. 224, 226 (Fla. 1939) (holding that misdemeanor must
be committed in presence of officer in such manner as to be detected through officer's own
senses); State v. Stevens, 574 So. 2d 197, 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that arresting
officer must have perceived all elements of misdemeanor to make warrantless arrest); Towne
v. State, 495 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(allowing only officer's own observations
to be considered in determining probable cause to arrest), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990);
Phillips v. State, 314 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that authority for
misdemeanor arrest depends on commission of offense in officer's presence); Rosenberg v.
State, 264 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that legality of warrantless
misdemeanor arrest depends on whether arresting officer had substantial reason to believe
person was committing offense).
234. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.15(6),(8).
235. Id. § 901.15(7)(a).
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Some civil libertarians and criminal defense attorneys have suggested
the provisions for arrest without warrant in Florida's new stalking law are
unconstitutional. 26 The new law gives a law enforcement officer independent
authority to arrest without warrant any person he has probable cause to
believe has committed stalking-a first degree misdemeanor.? Unlike do-
mestic violence or child abuse, however, stalking is not one of the enumer-
ated exceptions to the basic statutory requirement that the defendant commit
the misdemeanor in the officer's presence to allow arrest without a war-
rant. 8  It would be logical for the Florida legislature to have included
stalking among those statutory exceptions, given the similar nature of the
crimes. The legislature most likely forgot to amend its arrest without warrant
statute in its haste to pass a tough law prohibiting stalking.2?9 However,
this omission should not prove fatal, because the statute governing arrest
without warrant disclaims limiting arrest authority conferred by other sec-
tions.m Although Florida courts have imposed stringent requirements on
warrantless misdemeanor arrests in the past, this disclaimer should give the
stalking law's arrest without warrant provisions sufficient support to survive
a legal challenge.
Ohio statutory law states that an officer may make a misdemeanor
arrest without a warrant only if the officer finds the person violating the
law or ordinance?"4 Ohio courts have interpreted this law as requiring that
the defendant commit the misdemeanor in the officer's presence.2 2 However,
the courts have made exceptions for arrests outside the officer's presence
when the arresting officer clearly had probable cause.243 As in Florida, there
are also statutory exceptions to the presence requirement. Ohio law has
provided that an officer may arrest and detain any person he has reasonable
grounds to believe has committed child enticement, public indecency, or
domestic violence.24 The Ohio legislature has amended that law to include
stalking among the misdemeanor offenses which do not require a warrant
236. See Law Gives Stalking Victims Hope, Cm. DAI.Y L. BuLL'., Apr. 14, 1992, at I
(quoting Florida ACLU staff counsel Nina E. Vinik that stalking law arrest without warrant
provisions are "troubling").
237. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(5).
238. Id. § 901.15.
239. Interview with David De LaPaz, Assistant State Attorney, in Daytona Beach, Florida
(Dec. 28, 1992).
240. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15. "This subsection does not limit the arrest authority
conferred on such officer by any other provision of law." Id.
241. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(A) (Baldwin 1992).
242. State v. Reymann, 563 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 536
N.E.2d 1171 (Ohio 1989); State v. Holmes, 501 N.E.2d 629, 633 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
243. See Oregon v. Szakovits, 291 N.E.2d 742 (Ohio 1972) (holding that arresting officer
had authority to make DUI arrest after viewing scene of accident and hearing drunk driver's
admissions); City of Bucyrus v. Williams, 46 Ohio App.3d 43, 45-46 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting
Szakovits for proposition that officer's probable cause is sufficient to justify. warrantless
misdemeanor arrest).
244. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B).
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prior to arrest. 245 In amending its law governing warrantless misdemeanor
arrests in conjunction with passage of its stalking law, Ohio appears to
have avoided the controversy surrounding the Florida law.
F. Mandatory Minimum Sentence
The Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits
punishment that is out of proportion to the offense committed.246 Apart
from death penalty cases, however, the Supreme Court has shown consid-
erable deference to state legislatures' judgment about penalties for specific
offenses; the Court seldom has held that a term of imprisonment is uncon-
stitutional because of its length. 247 In particular, the Court recently has
shown great support for state legislation requiring mandatory minimum
prison terms for certain offenses.
241
Massachusetts courts have held that the state constitutional provisions
prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment are as broad as
those in, the Eighth Amendment. 249 Punishment may be cruel and unusual
not only in its manner, but also in its length. 0 In deciding whether a
sentence is disproportionate to the offense, a Massachusetts court will
examine the nature of the offense and offender in light of the degree of
harm to society, compare the sentence imposed with punishments prescribed
for more serious crimes, and compare the challenged penalty with penalties
for the same offense in other jurisdictions. 251 Like the United States Supreme
245. Id.
246. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983). In addition to affirming the principle of
proportionality, the Solem court established three criteria for determining whether criminal
sentences are disproportionate: the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
the sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed
for the commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 290-92. For an early
example of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, see Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that sentence of 15 years hard labor for crime of
falsifying official records was excessive under Eighth Amendment).
247. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (holding that 40 year sentence for
possession of less than nine ounces of marijuana was not cruel and unusual punishment);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding that mandatory life sentence after third minor
felony conviction was not cruel and unusual punishment).
248. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1992) (holding that mandatory life
sentence without possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine is not
cruel and unusual punishment); Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1992) (holding
that five year mandatory minimum sentence for distribution of more than one ounce of LSD
is not cruel and unusual punishment); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding
that five year mandatory minimum sentence for commission of felony while visibly possessing
firearm was not unconstitutional).
249. Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex County, 458 N.E.2d 702 (Mass. 1983).
250. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166, 171 (Mass. 1976); Commonwealth v.
Morrow, 296 N.E.2d 468, 476 (Mass. 1973); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875
(Mass. 1899), aff'd, 180 U.S. 311 (1901).
251. Commonwealth v. Bianco, 454 N.E.2d 901, 905 (Mass. 1983); Commonwealth v.
Diatchencko, 443 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Mass. 1982); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166,
171 (Mass. 1976).
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Court, Massachusetts courts have shown great deference to the legislature's
imposition of mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses. 212 Given
this judicial deference to mandatory minimum sentencing schemes, Massa-
chusetts' requirement of a one year mandatory minimum sentence for
stalking in violation of a restraining order or injunction 253 and two year
mandatory minimum sentence for a second or subsequent stalking conviction?
will most likely survive any constitutional challenge.
VII. FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND MODEL STATUTE
In response to the potential problems with many of the state stalking
laws, in 1992 Senator William S. Cohen of Maine and Congresswoman
Nancy Pelosi of California proposed an examination of these laws as a
precedent to possible federal criminalization of stalking. 255 The enacted law
instructed the Attorney General (through the National Institute of Justice)
to: (I) evaluate existing and proposed anti-stalking legislation in the states,
(2) develop model anti-stalking legislation that is constitutional and enforce-
able, (3) prepare and disseminate to state authorities the findings made as
a result of such evaluation, and (4) report to the Congress the findings and 6
the need or appropriateness of further action by the federal government by
September 30, 1993.256 In early 1993 Congressman Royce and Senator Boxer
of California and Senator Robert Krueger of Texas introduced bills that




It is difficult to predict what the model federal stalking law will look
like in its final form. The law should be drafted carefully to eliminate
potential overbreadth and vagueness problems like those previously dis-
cussed.2 It should avoid the statutory presumptions of the Michigan and
Washington statutes. 259 Given the nature of stalking, provisions for preven-
252. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 596 N.E.2d 325, 331 (Mass. 1992) (upholding
two year mandatory sentence enhancement for selling drugs in school zone); Commonwealth
v. Therriault, 515 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (Mass. 1987) (holding one year mandatory minimum for
homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated not to be cruel and unusual punishment);
Diatchenko, 443 N.E.2d at 403 (finding mandatory life sentence for first degree murder not
to be disproportionate).
253. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43(b) (West Supp. 1993).
254. Id. § 43(c).
255. S. 2922, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 138 CONG. Rc. S9527; H.R. 5876, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992). See Schiesel, supra note 16, at 5 (explaining details of Cohen-Pelosi bill).
256. Act of Oct. 6, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 109(b). See Larder, supra note 97, at
A2 (describing conference evaluating state anti-stalking laws).
257. Both bills would require the stalker to cross state boundaries, use the mail, or
commit the offense on federal land to be liable under federal law. S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993); H.R. 740, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
258. See supra notes 99-136 and accompanying text (discussing overbreadth problems in
stalking laws) and notes 137-173 and accompanying text (discussing vagueness problems in
stalking laws).
259. MICH. COMe. LAWS § 750.411h (Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110
(West Supp. 1993). See supra notes 174-91 and accompanying text (discussing validity of
statutory presumptions in Michigan's and Washington's stalking laws).
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tive detention of the accused stalker may be appropriate. 260 It might include
provisions to allow police to arrest suspected stalkers without a warrant, as
in Florida and Ohio.261 The law should include mandatory minimum sen-
tences for stalkers who violate injunctions or restraining orders or are repeat
offenders, as in Massachusetts. 262 With evidence indicating that many stalkers
are mentally disturbed, 263 the law should contain provisions for psychological
counseling as a condition of sentence or parole for a convicted stalker, as
in Illinois and Hawaii. 26 If it incorporated all of these various features, the
model federal stalking law might look like this:
1. Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows,
contacts, or places under surveillance another person with the intent
to harass that person is guilty of the crime of stalking. Stalking is
a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for
not more than a year or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
2. Any person who violates subsection (1) and who either:
a. Makes a credible threat against that person or a member
of that person's immediate family with the intent to place that
person in reasonable fear of death or serious injury; or
b. Confines, restrains, or causes bodily harm to that person
is guilty of aggravated stalking. Aggravated stalking is a felony
punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years, or a fine
of not more than $2,000, or both.
3. Any person who violates subsections (1) or (2) when a restraining
order or injunction is in effect prohibiting such behavior by that
person against the same party is guilty of a felony, punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one year and not
more than five years. No sentence for any violation of this subsec-
tion shall be less than the mandatory minimum term of imprison-
ment of one year. A person convicted under this subsection shall
not be eligible for probation, parole, furlough, work release, or
260. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 725, para 5/110-6.3 (Smith-Hurd 1993). The validity of any
provisions for preventive detention in a particular state would depend on the law governing
bail in that state. See supra notes 192-227 and accompanying text (discussing validity of
provisions for denying bail to stalkers in Illinois, Ohio, and Iowa).
261. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(5) (West Supp. 1993); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03
(Baldwin Supp. 1992). The validity of a provision for arresting a stalker without a warrant in
a particular state would depend on whether that state's law allowed for such arrest. See supra
notes 228-45 and accompanying text (discussing validity of provisions for arrest without warrant
in Florida's and Ohio's stalking laws).
262. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1993). See supra notes 246-254
and accompanying text (discussing mandatory minimum sentences in Massachusetts's stalking
law).
263. See supra note 11 (citing authority questioning the deterrent effect of anti-stalking
legislation on mentally disturbed stalkers).
264. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/3-14-5 (Smith-Hurd 1992); HAw. Rav. STAT. § 711-
1106.5 (Supp. 1992); see supra note 46 (discussing psychological counseling provisions in
Illinois's and Hawaii's -stalking laws).
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reduction of sentence until he or she has served the mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment.
4. Any person who violates subsections (1),(2) or (3) within five
years of a previous conviction under any of those subsections
involving the same victim is guilty of a felony, punishable by
imprisonment for not less than two years and not more than five
years. No sentence for any violation of this subsection shall be less
than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years.
A person convicted under this subsection shall not be eligible for
probation, parole, furlough, work release, or reduction of sentence
until he or she has served the mandatory minimum term of impris-
onment.
5. As used in this section:
a. "Harass" means to knowingly and willfully engage in a
course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously
alarms that person and which serves no legitimate purpose.
b. "Course of conduct" means a series of acts, over time,
evidencing a continuity of purpose. The course of conduct must be
one that -would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress. Constitutionally protected activity is not included
within the meaning of "course of conduct."
c. "Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent and
apparent ability to carry it out so as to cause the person who is
the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety.
6. Any law enforcement officer may arrest and detain until a
warrant can be obtained any person the officer has probable cause
to believe has violated the-provisions of this section. Probable cause
may be based on the statements of the alleged victim.
7. On petition by the State, the arraigning court shall hold a
hearing to determine whether bail should be denied to a defendant
charged with stalking or aggravated stalking. The court may deny
bail to the defendant after it determines that:
a. There is proof that the defendant committed the offense of
stalking or aggravated stalking; and
b. The defendant poses a real and present threat to' the physical
safety of the alleged victim of the offense; and
c. The denial of bail is necessary to prevent fulfillment of the
threat; and
d. There is no condition or combination of conditions short
of denying bail that can reasonably assure the safety of the alleged
victim.
8. At the hearing on bail, the defendant has the right to be
represented by counsel, to testify and present witnesses on his or
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her own behalf, and to cross-examine any witnesses called by the
State. The defendant does not have the right to compel the ap-
pearance of the alleged victim. 'The rules on the admissibility of
evidence at criminal trials do not apply to the bail hearing. A
motion by the defendant to suppress evidence shall not be enter-
tained. Evidence that proof may have been obtained as the result
of an unlav~ful search and seizure is not relevant to this state of
the prosecution.
9. The court may order psychological counseling as a condition
of any sentence imposed under subsections (1) through (4) of this
section and may order the parole board to consider psychological
counseling as a condition of parole or probation for any person
convicted under this section.
10. This section shall not apply to conduct which occurs during
labor picketing. This section shall also not apply to conduct which
occurs during the course of a lawful business activity, including,
but not limited to, the activity of licensed private investigators.
11. The provisions of this section are severable. If any subsection
or portion of a subsection is found unconstitutional, the rest of the
section shall be presumed valid until found otherwise.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the stalking laws passed in 1992 and 1993 will not eliminate
the problem of stalking, the legislation should help. It is true that some
states, in their haste to enact stalking laws, could have drafted their statutes
more carefully. As a group, however, the laws do not appear as constitu-
tionally infirm as some critics have suggested. Most of the laws reviewed
give the appearance of being carefully drafted to aggressively combat the
problem of stalking and yet survive judicial scrutiny. When it is finished,
the model federal stalking law should provide a good blueprint for those
states whose stalking legislation is constitutionally vulnerable.
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